Game Theoretic Approach for Resource Allocation in DiffServ Networks

Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering,The University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, U.K.{liangj,t.arvanitis,c.constantinou}@bham.ac.ukAbstract—In this paper, a new resource allocationscheme for Differentiated Services networks based onGame Theory is proposed. The proposed scheme usesdynamic packet prices and charges ‘aggressive’ users athigher fees than others. Rational users’ strategies for sub-mitting bandwidth requests are also analysed. Moreover,the conditions of the existence of a Nash Equilibriumare presented. Simulations show that our algorithm ishelpful in making users constrain their usage of networkresources, which can lead to better bandwidth allocations.Index Terms—Quality of Service (QoS), DifferentiatedServices, Resource allocation, and Game Theory.

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