How EU Markets Became More Competitive than US Markets: A Study of Institutional Drift

Many European markets today appear more competitive than their American counterparts. We document this surprising reversal of history and propose an explanation. Our model of political support predicts that a supranational regulator enforces free markets beyond the preferences of any individual country. We find that European institutions are indeed more independent and enforce competition more strongly than any individual country ever did. Countries with ex-ante weaker institutions benefit more from the delegation of competition policy to the EU level. Our model also explains why political and lobbying expenditures have increased more in America than in Europe.

[1]  Sophie Piton,et al.  Revisiting the Global Decline of the (Non-Housing) Labor Share , 2019, American Economic Review: Insights.

[2]  John Van Reenen,et al.  The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms , 2017, The Quarterly Journal of Economics.

[3]  Simcha Barkai Declining Labor and Capital Shares , 2019, The Journal of Finance.

[4]  S. Basu Are Price-Cost Markups Rising in the United States? A Discussion of the Evidence , 2019, Journal of Economic Perspectives.

[5]  Thomas Philippon,et al.  From Good to Bad Concentration? U.S. Industries over the past 30 years , 2019 .

[6]  Janice C. Eberly,et al.  Understanding Weak Capital Investment: The Role of Market Concentration and Intangibles , 2019 .

[7]  Jon Timmis,et al.  Industry Concentration in Europe and North America , 2019, OECD Productivity Working Papers.

[8]  Adam Chilton,et al.  Trade Openness and Antitrust Law , 2018, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[9]  Vasco M. Carvalho,et al.  NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF MICROECONOMIC SHOCKS: BEYOND HULTEN'S THEOREM , 2018 .

[10]  C. Syverson Macroeconomics and Market Power : Facts , Potential Explanations and Open Questions , 2019 .

[11]  Shawn W. Ulrick,et al.  Does Merger Policy Converge after the 2004 European Union Reforms , 2018 .

[12]  Roni Michaely,et al.  Are U.S. Industries Becoming More Concentrated? , 2018 .

[13]  Adam Chilton,et al.  Competition Law Around the World from 1889 to 2010: The Competition Law Index , 2018, Journal of Competition Law & Economics.

[14]  Simon Gilchrist,et al.  Financial Heterogeneity and Monetary Union , 2018, Finance and Economics Discussion Series.

[15]  R. Hall New Evidence on the Markup of Prices Over Marginal Costs and the Role of Mega-Firms in the Us Economy , 2018 .

[16]  Janice C. Eberly,et al.  Intangibles, Investment, and Efficiency , 2018 .

[17]  Luke M. Froeb,et al.  Don't Panic: A Guide to Claims of Increasing Concentration , 2018 .

[18]  J. Mairesse,et al.  Rent Creation and Sharing: New Measures and Impactson TFP , 2018 .

[19]  D. Furceri,et al.  The Effects of Labor and Product Market Reforms: The Role of Macroeconomic Conditions and Policies , 2018 .

[20]  C. Lim,et al.  Dynamic Natural Monopoly Regulation: Time Inconsistency, Moral Hazard, and Political Environments , 2018, Journal of Political Economy.

[21]  Bingjie Hu,et al.  A Narrative Database of Major Labor and Product Market Reforms in Advanced Economies , 2018, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[22]  Janice C. Eberly,et al.  Investment Hollowing Out , 2018 .

[23]  C. Shapiro Antitrust in a Time of Populism , 2017, International Journal of Industrial Organization.

[24]  German Gutierrez Gallardo Investigating Global Labor and Profit Shares , 2017 .

[25]  James Bailey,et al.  Regulating away competition: the effect of regulation on entrepreneurship and employment , 2017 .

[26]  Jan Eeckhout,et al.  The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications* , 2020, The Quarterly Journal of Economics.

[27]  Thomas Philippon,et al.  Is There an Investment Gap in Advanced Economies? If So, Why? , 2017 .

[28]  Thomas Philippon,et al.  Declining Competition and Investment in the U.S , 2017 .

[29]  A. Bradford,et al.  Is E.U. Merger Control Used for Protectionism? An Empirical Analysis , 2017 .

[30]  David Sondermann,et al.  Lobbying in Europe: New Firm-Level Evidence , 2017 .

[31]  E. Canton,et al.  Estimating Mark-ups and the Effect of Product Market Regulations in Selected Professional Services Sectors: A Firm-level Analysis , 2017 .

[32]  Suraj Srinivasan,et al.  Political Influence and Merger Antitrust Reviews , 2017 .

[33]  Jr. John E. Kwoka Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A Response to the FTC Critique , 2017 .

[34]  Ricardo J. Caballero,et al.  Rents, Technical Change, and Risk Premia , 2017 .

[35]  Ricardo J. Caballero,et al.  Rents, Technical Change, and Risk Premia: Accounting for Secular Trends in Interest Rates, Returns on Capital, Earning Yields, and Factor Shares , 2017 .

[36]  John Van Reenen,et al.  Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share , 2017, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[37]  S. Ganapati Oligopolies, Prices, Output, and Productivity , 2017 .

[38]  Thomas Philippon,et al.  Ownership, Governance and Investment* , 2017 .

[39]  M. Vita,et al.  John Kwoka's Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A Critical Review , 2016 .

[40]  Thomas Philippon,et al.  Investmentless Growth: An Empirical Investigation , 2016 .

[41]  BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF MARKET POWER Introduction , 2016 .

[42]  S. Davis Regulatory Complexity and Policy Uncertainty: Headwinds of Our Own Making , 2015 .

[43]  Bent E. Sørensen,et al.  How to Construct Nationally Representative Firm Level Data from the ORBIS Global Database , 2015 .

[44]  Cristiana Vitale,et al.  New Indicators of Competition Law and Policy in 2013 for OECD and non-OECD Countries , 2013 .

[45]  H. Schweitzer,et al.  The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law , 2013 .

[46]  J. Greenwood,et al.  The Transparency Register: A European vanguard of strong lobby regulation? , 2013 .

[47]  H. First,et al.  Antitrust's Democracy Deficit , 2013 .

[48]  G. Spagnolo,et al.  Competition Policy and Productivity Growth: An Empirical Assessment , 2009, Review of Economics and Statistics.

[49]  R. Posner,et al.  How Business Fares in the Supreme Court , 2013 .

[50]  G. Zucman,et al.  Capital is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries, 1700-2010 , 2013 .

[51]  M. Gregor Corporate Lobbying: A Review of the Recent Literature , 2011 .

[52]  Paolo Buccirossi,et al.  MEASURING THE DETERRENCE PROPERTIES OF COMPETITION POLICY: THE COMPETITION POLICY INDEXES , 2011 .

[53]  Kara M. Reynolds,et al.  The Determinants of State-Level Antitrust Activity , 2010 .

[54]  Shawn W. Ulrick,et al.  Comparing Merger Policies in the European Union and the United States , 2010 .

[55]  M. Carree,et al.  European Commission Decisions on Competition: Economic Perspectives on Landmark Antitrust and Merger Cases , 2010 .

[56]  J. Pelkmans Product Market Reforms in EU Countries: Are the Methodology and Evidence Sufficiently Robust? , 2010 .

[57]  S. Voigt The Effects of Competition Policy on Development – Cross-Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators , 2009 .

[58]  D. Chorafas Capitalism Without Capital , 2009 .

[59]  Zeitz Dirk Overview of microeconomic reforms undertaken by EU Member States based on the MICREF database - 1. Volume , 2009 .

[60]  Brigitte Leucht Transatlantic policy networks in the creation of the first European anti-trust law: mediating between American anti-trust and German ordo-liberalism , 2009 .

[61]  C. Mahoney Brussels versus the Beltway , 2008 .

[62]  J. Harrington,et al.  Issues in Antitrust Enforcement , 2007 .

[63]  Rawi E. Abdelal Playing the Market: A Political Strategy for Uniting Europe, 1985–2005 , 2007, Perspectives on Politics.

[64]  D. Martimort,et al.  Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator , 2007 .

[65]  M. Ivaldi,et al.  The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and Practice , 2007 .

[66]  M. Carree,et al.  European Antitrust Policy 1957–2004: An Analysis of Commission Decisions , 2010 .

[67]  Keith N. Hylton,et al.  Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effects , 2006 .

[68]  E. Papaioannou,et al.  Red Tape and Delayed Entry , 2006 .

[69]  A. Alesina,et al.  The Future of Europe: Reform or Decline , 2006 .

[70]  R. Griffith,et al.  Product Market Reform and Innovation in the EU , 2006 .

[71]  Simon Johnson,et al.  Chapter 6 Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth , 2005 .

[72]  J. Hölscher,et al.  Competition Policy in Central Eastern Europe in the Light of EU Accession , 2004 .

[73]  Chad Syverson,et al.  Market Structure and Productivity: A Concrete Example , 2004, Journal of Political Economy.

[74]  Leora F. Klapper,et al.  Entry Regulation as a Barrier to Entrepreneurship , 2004 .

[75]  R. Rajan,et al.  Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists , 2003 .

[76]  Jacob K. Thomas,et al.  Equity Premia as Low as Three Percent? Evidence from Analysts' Earnings Forecasts for Domestic and International Stock Markets , 2001 .

[77]  Xavier Debrun Bargaining Over EMU Vs. EMS: Why Might the ECB be the Twin Sister of the Bundesbank? , 2001 .

[78]  D. Gerber Law and Competition in Twentieth-Century Europe , 2001 .

[79]  N. Economides U.S. Telecommunications Today , 1998 .

[80]  W. Cole A regulatory burden. , 1992, The New York state dental journal.

[81]  D. North Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance: Economic performance , 1990 .

[82]  Shin-ichi Kasamatsu Regulatory reform in the United States and Japan , 1987 .

[83]  Kenneth Rogoff,et al.  The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target''Quarterly Journal of Economics , 1985 .

[84]  R. Barro,et al.  Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy , 1983 .

[85]  G. Calvo,et al.  On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy , 1978 .

[86]  Finn E. Kydland,et al.  Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans , 1977, Journal of Political Economy.

[87]  Bela Balassa,et al.  The Purchasing-Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal , 1964, Journal of Political Economy.

[88]  D. Jorgenson Capital Theory and Investment Behavior , 1963 .