A modal active-logic with focus of attention for reasoning in time

Real agents must work within the limitations or bounds imposed by their environment and by their own makeup. Among the resources available only in limited quantities are time, space, and information. Most formal attempts to model agents assume that an agent is able to reason forever in a timeless present as if the world had stopped for the agent's bene t. They also assume that the agent is unconsciousness of external events and that his knowledge base is consistent. Unconsciousness to external events means that the agent's world is static. Consistency is the assumption that the agent's knowledge is consistent. In the real world unreliable sensors are very common and may cause inconsistency in the agent's knowledge base. This work is intended to narrow the gap between formal models for agents and realistic agents. We consider the following issues: limitation of reasoning, consciousness to external events and consistency of knowledge bases. The semantics we use are based upon the Montague semantics. We present a sound and complete framework for a bounded agent with these properties. 5

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