论文信息 - Stochastic games: Existence of the MinMax

Stochastic games: Existence of the MinMax

The existence of the value for stochastic games with finitely many states and actions, as well as for a class of stochastic games with infinitely many states and actions, is proved in [2]. Here we use essentially the same tools to derive the existence of the minmax and maxmin for n-player stochastic games with finitely many states and actions, as well as for a corresponding class of n-person stochastic games with infinitely many states and actions.

Abraham Neyman

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