Graph-based Cyber Security Analysis of State Estimation in Smart Power Grid

The smart power grid enables intelligent automation at all levels of power system operation, from electricity generation at power plants to power usage in the home. The key enabling factor of an efficient smart grid is its built-in ICT, which monitors the real-time system operating state and makes control decisions accordingly. As an important building block of the ICT system, power system state estimation is of critical importance to maintain normal operation of the smart grid, which, however, is under mounting threat from potential cyber attacks. In this article, we introduce a graph-based framework for performing cyber-security analysis in power system state estimation. Compared to conventional arithmetic- based security analysis, the graphical characterization of state estimation security provides intuitive visualization of some complex problem structures and enables efficient graphical solution algorithms, which are useful for both defending and attacking the ICT system of the smart grid. We also highlight several promising future research directions on graph-based security analysis and its applications in smart power grid.

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