Corporate Governance and Innovation

Abstract We use Tobin’s q models of investments to estimate the relationship between corporate governance and the level of innovative activity. Simple ordinary least squares (OLS) models suggest that poor governance reduces innovative activity. However, OLS results are sensitive to controlling for serial correlation, unobserved effects, or using instrumental variables to control simultaneity. Controlling for these effects substantially reduces or eliminates the relationship between governance and innovative activity.

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