Strategic behavior and regulation research in accounting

Abstract This paper focuses on models of political behavior that implicitly or explicitly form the foundation for empirical economic consequences studies in accounting. The studies that have appeared adopt a single-period of single-agendum-item perspective. This paper discusses differences in rational political behavior that arise naturally in single-period versus multiperiod settings. The behavioral implications of varying configurations of available information on agents' “ preferences” are also considered. Because of the tremendously complex empirical domain being studied, examples are relied on heavily to motivate the discussion rather than engaging in a formal modeling exercise.

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