Breaking Up Is Hard To Do: Modeling Security Threats for Smart Cards

Smart card systems differ from conventional computer systems in that different aspects of the system are not under a single trust boundary. The processor, I/O, data, programs, and network may be controlled by different, and hostile, parties. We discuss the security ramifications of these "splits" in trust, showing that they are fundamental to a proper understanding of the security of systems that include smart cards.

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