论文信息 - The Communication Complexity of Private Value Single Item Auctions

The Communication Complexity of Private Value Single Item Auctions

This paper is concerned with information revelation in single-item auctions. We compute how much data needs to be transmitted in three strategically equivalent auctions-the Vickrey auction, the English auction and the recently proposed bisection auction-and show that in the truth-telling equilibrium the bisection auction is the best performer.

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