A review and synthesis

in Dutch Door de financiële crisis staat systeemrisico centraal op de beleidsagenda. Bij zo’n crisis verspreidt een schok zich naar andere financiële instellingen. De schok wordt daarbij versterkt, waardoor het financiële systeem in gevaar komt. We geven een overzicht van de literatuur over dergelijke versterkingsmechanismen die externaliteiten creëren van de risico’s die banken nemen. We onderscheiden twee typen mechanismen: besmetting binnen de financiële sector, en de procyclische connectie tussen de financiële sector en de reële economie. Regulering kan systeemrisico verminderen door externaliteiten in te perken. Hierbij spelen echter verschillende problemen. Ten eerste zijn systeemrisico en de kosten ervan moeilijk de kwantificeren. Ten tweede hebben banken prikkels om regulering van systeemrisico te ontduiken. Ten derde staan toezichthouders bloot aan de verleiding om te laat in te grijpen. Ten slotte kunnen overheden zich moeilijk eraan committeren om systeembanken niet te redden. Hierdoor hebben markten geen prikkel om systeemrisico te beprijzen. Het versterken van marktdiscipline kan helpen om deze problemen te verminderen, omdat het toezichthouders disciplineert, niet afhangt van complexe informatievereisten en moeilijk te manipuleren is. Steekwoorden: financiële markten, besmetting, systeemrisico

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