Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies

This paper provides a formal framework within which to study cooperative behavior in the presence of incomplete information, and shows how far the known results in the static cooperative game theory can readily be applied to the proposed framework. The new concepts of Bayesian society, Bayesian strong equilibrium and Bayesian incentive compatible strong equilibrium are introduced and studied.

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