Motivation losses in small groups: a social dilemma analysis

Theory developed to account for behavior in social dilemmas—situations in which - the rational pursuit of self-interest can lead to collective disaster—was applied to the analysis of group motivation losses. Two group motivation loss effects demonstrated in previous research, the social-loafing effect and the free-rider effect, were shown to follow from social dilemma theories. An experiment was performed to empirically demonstrate a third motivation loss effect, termed the sucker effect. It was hypothesized that group members would reduce their efforts if they had a capable partner.who free rode on their efforts, that is, who was capable of contributing to the group but would not. This prediction was confirmed. The effect was particularly strong in males. Potential remedies for such motivation losses were discussed.

[1]  W. Moede,et al.  Die Richtlinien der Leistungs-psychologie. , 2022 .

[2]  L. Festinger.  A Theory of Social Comparison Processes , 1954 .

[3]  A. Gouldner.  THE NORM OF RECIPROCITY: A PRELIMINARY STATEMENT * , 1960 .

[4]  Sidney C. Sufrin,et al.  The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. , 1966 .

[5]  G. Hardin,et al.  The Tragedy of the Commons , 1968, Green Planet Blues.

[6]  I. Lane,et al.  Distribution of Insufficient, Sufficient, and Oversufficient Rewards: A Clarification of Equity Theory. , 1972 .

[7]  I. Steiner.  Group process and productivity , 1972 .

[8]  John W. Sweeney.  An experimental investigation of the free-rider problem , 1973 .

[9]  A. Ingham,et al.  The Ringelmann effect: Studies of group size and group performance , 1974 .

[10]  Melvin J. Kimmel,et al.  Twenty Years of Experimental Gaming: Critique,Synthesis, and Suggestions for the Future , 1977 .

[11]  Robyn M. Dawes,et al.  Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other people's behavior in a commons dilemma situation. , 1977 .

[12]  K. Williams,et al.  Many Hands Make Light the Work: The Causes and Consequences of Social Loafing , 1979 .

[13]  G. Marwell,et al.  Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. II. Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem , 1980, American Journal of Sociology.

[14]  K. Williams,et al.  Identifiability as a deterrant to social loafing: Two cheering experiments. , 1981 .

[15]  H. Reis,et al.  Sex differences in reward allocation: Subjects, partners, and tasks. , 1981 .

[16]  Robert J. Waller,et al.  Social Traps , 1980, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics.

[17]  N. Kerr,et al.  Ringelmann Revisited , 1981 .

[18]  Bruno S. Frey,et al.  Self‐interest and collective action: The economics and psychology of public goods , 1982 .

[19]  David M. Messick,et al.  INDIVIDUAL ADAPTATIONS AND STRUCTURAL-CHANGE AS SOLUTIONS TO SOCIAL DILEMMAS , 1983 .

[20]  N. Kerr,et al.  Dispensability of member effort and group motivation losses: Free-rider effects , 1983 .