On the Evolutionary Emergence of Optimism

Successful individuals were frequently found to be overly optimistic. These finding are puzzling, as one could expect that realists would perform best in the long run. We show, however, that in a large class of strategic interactions of either cooperation or competition, the equilibrium payoffs of optimists may be higher than those of realists. This is because the very fact of being optimistic changes the game, and drives the adversary to change her equilibrium behavior, possibly to the benefit of the optimist.

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