Random key predistribution for wireless sensor networks using deployment knowledge

We consider a key distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks which uses deployment knowledge. Deployment is modeled as a grid of hexagonal clusters, into centers of which the sensor nodes are dropped according to a given probability distribution (e.g. a Gaussian one). We consider sensor connectivity in a random intersection graph model, instead of the more commonly used in literature G(n, p) graph model. While the latter is easier to analyze, the former is much more suitable to modeling sensor network key distribution. We provide analytical, asymptotic results showing how to pick parameters (key pool size |S|, the number of chosen keys d) depending on the number of deployed nodes in order to assure global connectivity of the network, and estimate the diameter of the network for the given parameters.

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