论文信息 - A New Allocation Method for Simple Bargaining Problems: The Shapley Rule

A New Allocation Method for Simple Bargaining Problems: The Shapley Rule

Simple bargaining problems with transferable utility are considered. By associating a quasi-additive cooperative game with each one of them, a Shapley rule for this class of problems is derived from the Shapley value for games. The analysis of this new rule includes axiomatic characterizations and a comparison with the proportional rule.

Francesc Carreras | Guillermo Owen

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