An enhanced-security buck DC-DC converter with true-random-number-based pseudo hysteresis controller for internet-of-everything (IoE) Devices

As far as Internet-of-Everything (IoE) devices are concerned, strong security and low electromagnetic interference (EMI) are design requirements for power management to guarantee personal data protection. [1] is robust under power side-channel attacks (PSCA), but a power injection attack (PIA) results in limited random-number generation (RN), as shown in the upper left of Fig. 7.5.1. The loop randomization technique in [1] is cracked and vulnerable to PIA, since predictability and reproducibility arise in the linear feedback shift register (LFSR). Moreover, the PIA narrows the LFSR-based random switching frequency (fSW) in [1] and reduces the triangular modulation frequency (fmod) in [2] to around 1/N times of fsw. Consequently, the EMI noise floor fails to meet the specification of EN 55032 Class B, as shown in the upper right of Fig. 7.5.1. Other techniques offer counter measures to improve resistance against malicious attacks, but result in either increased power consumption [3] or large hardware overhead [4].

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[2]  Sanu Mathew,et al.  8.1 Improved power-side-channel-attack resistance of an AES-128 core via a security-aware integrated buck voltage regulator , 2017, 2017 IEEE International Solid-State Circuits Conference (ISSCC).

[3]  Gyu-Hyeong Cho,et al.  12.1 A 0.518mm2 quasi-current-mode hysteretic buck DC-DC converter with 3μs load transient response in 0.35μm BCDMOS , 2015, 2015 IEEE International Solid-State Circuits Conference - (ISSCC) Digest of Technical Papers.

[4]  Lenian He,et al.  25.2 A 10MHz 3-to-40V VIN tri-slope gate driving GaN DC-DC converter with 40.5dBµV spurious noise compression and 79.3% ringing suppression for automotive applications , 2017, 2017 IEEE International Solid-State Circuits Conference (ISSCC).

[5]  Jean-Max Dutertre,et al.  A side-channel and fault-attack resistant AES circuit working on duplicated complemented values , 2011, 2011 IEEE International Solid-State Circuits Conference.