Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation

This paper examines the returns earned by subscribing to initial public offerings of equity. K. Rock (1986) suggests that initial public offerings of equity returns are required by uninformed investors as compensation for the risk of trading against superior information. The authors show that initial public offerings of equity with more informed investor capital require higher returns. The marketing underwriter's reputation reveals the expected level of "informed" activity. Prestigious underwriters are associated with lower risk offerings. With less risk there is less incentive to acquire information and fewer informed investors. Consequently, prestigious underwriters are associated with initial public offerings of equity that have lower returns. Copyright 1990 by American Finance Association.

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