Quality and Quantity of Information Exchange

The paper deals with credible and relevant information flow in dialogs: How useful is it for a receiver to get some information, how useful is it for a sender to give this information, and how much credible information can we expect to flow between sender and receiver? What is the relation between semantics and pragmatics? These Gricean questions will be addressed from a decision and game-theoretical point of view.

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