The Free Haven Project: Distributed Anonymous Storage Service

We present a design for a system of anonymous storage which resists the attempts of powerful adversaries to find or destroy any stored data. We enumerate distinct notions of anonymity for each party in the system, and suggest a way to classify anonymous systems based on the kinds of anonymity provided. Our design ensures the availability of each document for a publisher-specified lifetime. A reputation system provides server accountability by limiting the damage caused from misbehaving servers. We identify attacks and defenses against anonymous storage services, and close with a list of problems which are currently unsolved.

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