Modelling and strategy optimisation for a kind of networked evolutionary games with memories under the bankruptcy mechanism

ABSTRACT This paper investigates the evolutionary dynamic and strategy optimisation for a kind of networked evolutionary games whose strategy updating rules incorporate ‘bankruptcy’ mechanism, and the situation that each player's bankruptcy is due to the previous continuous low profits gaining from the game is considered. First, by using semi-tensor product of matrices method, the evolutionary dynamic of this kind of games is expressed as a higher order logical dynamic system and then converted into its algebraic form, based on which, the evolutionary dynamic of the given games can be discussed. Second, the strategy optimisation problem is investigated, and some free-type control sequences are designed to maximise the total payoff of the whole game. Finally, an illustrative example is given to show that our new results are very effective.

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