Mechanism Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types and Interdependent Valuations
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Richard Zeckhauser | Scott Johnson | John W. Pratt | Nolan Miller | R. Zeckhauser | J. Pratt | Nolan Miller | Scott Johnson
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