Mandatory Subordinated Debt and the Corporate Governance of Banks

Given current debates on the future direction of bank regulatory design, the objective of this paper is to raise awareness of a new and potentially significant tool in the corporate governance of banks. Public policy proposals to improve the nature of bank regulation through private-sector solutions and, in particular, mandatory subordinated debt market discipline provide such an opportunity. This paper argues that apart from creating an additional class of bank stakeholder whose interests align with the risk-reduction objectives of the regulatory authorities, a suitable mandatory subordinated debt policy (MSDP) could also provide a new and meaningful voice in the corporate governance of banks.

[1]  M. Hall,et al.  A Framework for Market Discipline in Bank Regulatory Design , 2005 .

[2]  Market Discipline in the Governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies , 2001 .

[3]  R. Litan,et al.  American finance for the 21st century , 1998 .

[4]  A. Estrella Costs and benefits of mandatory subordinated debt regulation for banks , 2000 .

[5]  Charles W. Calomiris,et al.  Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina, 1992-1999 , 2000 .

[6]  B. Bernanke,et al.  Non-Monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression , 1983 .

[7]  Douglas D. Evanoff,et al.  Reforming Bank Capital Regulation: Using Subordinated Debt to Enhance Market and Supervisory Discipline , 2001 .

[8]  Helen A. Garten Banking On the Market: Relying On Depositors to Control Bank Risks , 1986 .

[9]  Clas Wihlborg,et al.  The New Basel Capital Accord: Making it Effective with Stronger Market Discipline , 2002 .

[10]  Andrew Crockett,et al.  Market Discipline and Financial Stability , 2002 .

[11]  H. Huizinga,et al.  Market Discipline and Financial Safety Net Design , 1999 .

[12]  S. Prowse CORPORATE CONTROL IN COMMERCIAL BANKS , 1997 .

[13]  Louis H. Ederington,et al.  The Informational Content of Bond Ratings , 1984 .

[14]  G. Hanweck Subordinated Debt and the Quality of Market Discipline in Banking , 2001 .

[15]  Subordinated Debt and Equity: Complements or Substitutes? , 2002 .

[16]  D. Llewellyn Alternative approaches to regulation and corporate governance in financial firms , 2001 .

[17]  Timothy D. Lane Market Discipline , 1992, Global Financial Development Report 2019/2020: Bank Regulation and Supervision a Decade after the Global Financial Crisis.

[18]  Douglas D. Evanoff Preferred Sources of Market Discipline , 1993 .

[19]  Charles W. Calomiris,et al.  Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline , 2001 .

[20]  Sattar Mansi,et al.  Assessing Credit Rating Agencies by Bond Issuers and Institutional Investors , 2001 .

[21]  Charles Goodhart,et al.  Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now? , 1998 .

[22]  M. Hall The basle Committee's proposals for a new capital adequacy assessment framework: a critique , 2001 .

[23]  Paul M. Horvitz,et al.  Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking. , 1986 .

[24]  James R. Barth,et al.  The great savings and loan debacle , 1991 .

[25]  A. Sironi An Analysis of European Banks' SND Issues and its Implications for the Design of a Mandatory Subordinated Debt Policy , 2000 .

[26]  Banking deregulation in Europe , 1987 .

[27]  Charles W. Calomiris Building an incentive-compatible safety net , 1999 .

[28]  D. Hancock,et al.  Using Subordinated Debt to Monitor Bank Holding Companies: Is it Feasible? , 2001 .

[29]  R. Bliss,et al.  Market Discipline in the Governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: Monitoring vs. Influencing , 2001 .

[30]  Philip H. Dybvig,et al.  Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity , 1983, Journal of Political Economy.

[31]  Richard Cantor,et al.  The Credit Rating Industry , 1995 .

[32]  Donald P. Morgan,et al.  Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry , 2000 .

[33]  W. Lang,et al.  Analysis of proposals for a minimum subordinated debt requirement 1 1 The opinions expressed here ar , 2002 .

[34]  Sorin M. Sorescu,et al.  Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983-1991 , 1996 .

[35]  Allen N. Berger Market discipline in banking , 1991 .

[36]  A. Sironi Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Subordinated Debt Issues , 2000 .