Price Learning-based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing

Mobile crowd sensing (MCS) is an emerging sensing paradigm that can be applied to build various smart city and IoT applications. In an MCS application, the participation level of mobile users plays an essential role. Thus a great many incentive mechanisms have been proposed to motivate users. However, most of these works focus on the bidding behavior of users and overlook the feature of task requesters. Specifically, there exists a disparity between the low payment a requester would like to make and the high reward a user would like to receive. In this work, we address this issue by designing a group-buying-based online incentive mechanism, which contains two stages: In Stage I, a price learning algorithm is designed to select winning tasks for each group of sensing tasks and obtain a competitive total budget for recruiting users. In Stage II, an online auction is conducted between group agents and online users before a given recruitment deadline. Through theoretical analysis and extensive evaluations, we show that the proposed mechanisms possess computational efficiency, individual rationality, budget balance, truthfulness, and good performance.

[1]  Anna R. Karlin,et al.  Competitive auctions , 2006, Games Econ. Behav..

[2]  Qian Zhang,et al.  Groupon in the Air: A three-stage auction framework for Spectrum Group-buying , 2013, 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM.

[3]  Yunhao Liu,et al.  Incentives for Mobile Crowd Sensing: A Survey , 2016, IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials.

[4]  Lei Chen,et al.  Free Market of Crowdsourcing: Incentive Mechanism Design for Mobile Sensing , 2014, IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems.

[5]  Xinglin Zhang,et al.  Incentive Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsensing With Heterogeneous Sensing Costs , 2019, IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology.

[6]  Daqing Zhang,et al.  Task Allocation in Mobile Crowd Sensing: State-of-the-Art and Future Opportunities , 2018, IEEE Internet of Things Journal.

[7]  Yiannis Kompatsiaris,et al.  Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Platforms , 2016, INSCI.

[8]  Xiang-Yang Li,et al.  How to crowdsource tasks truthfully without sacrificing utility: Online incentive mechanisms with budget constraint , 2014, IEEE INFOCOM 2014 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications.

[9]  John C. S. Lui,et al.  Incentive Mechanism and Rating System Design for Crowdsourcing Systems: Analysis, Tradeoffs and Inference , 2018, IEEE Transactions on Services Computing.

[10]  Qian Wang,et al.  Task-Bundling-Based Incentive for Location-Dependent Mobile Crowdsourcing , 2019, IEEE Communications Magazine.

[11]  Bo Li,et al.  TAHES: A Truthful Double Auction Mechanism for Heterogeneous Spectrums , 2012, IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications.

[12]  Tong Guo,et al.  CrowdTravel: scenic spot profiling by using heterogeneous crowdsourced data , 2017, Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Humanized Computing.

[13]  Xiaoying Gan,et al.  Crowdsensing-Based Consensus Incident Report for Road Traffic Acquisition , 2018, IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems.

[14]  Jizhong Zhao,et al.  Reliable Diversity-Based Spatial Crowdsourcing by Moving Workers , 2014, Proc. VLDB Endow..

[15]  Yi Wang,et al.  SmartPhoto: A Resource-Aware Crowdsourcing Approach for Image Sensing with Smartphones , 2014, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing.

[16]  Zhu Wang,et al.  CrowdTracker: Optimized Urban Moving Object Tracking Using Mobile Crowd Sensing , 2018, IEEE Internet of Things Journal.

[17]  Liang Liu,et al.  Frugal Online Incentive Mechanisms for Mobile Crowd Sensing , 2017, IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology.

[18]  Yifan Zhang,et al.  BundleSense: A Task-Bundling-Based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensings , 2020, 2020 29th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN).

[19]  Anna R. Karlin,et al.  Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions , 2002, ESA.

[20]  Rui Zhang,et al.  Differentially-Private Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourced Radio Environment Map Construction , 2019, IEEE INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications.

[21]  Bin Guo 1 Mobile Crowd Sensing and Computing : The Review of an Emergin g Human-Powered Sensing Paradigm , 2015 .

[22]  Tianqi Zhou,et al.  Truthful Double Auction for Joint Internet of Energy and Profit Optimization in Cognitive Radio Networks , 2018, IEEE Access.

[23]  Vijay Kumar,et al.  Online learning in online auctions , 2003, SODA '03.

[24]  Haoyi Xiong,et al.  Multi-Task Allocation in Mobile Crowd Sensing with Individual Task Quality Assurance , 2018, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing.

[25]  Fulvio Corno,et al.  SmartBike: an IoT Crowd Sensing Platform for Monitoring City Air Pollution , 2017 .

[26]  Xin Li,et al.  Multi-Task Allocation Under Time Constraints in Mobile Crowdsensing , 2021, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing.

[27]  Ioannis Z. Koukoutsidis Estimating Spatial Averages of Environmental Parameters Based on Mobile Crowdsensing , 2018, ACM Trans. Sens. Networks.

[28]  Jian Tang,et al.  Robust Incentive Tree Design for Mobile Crowdsensing , 2017, 2017 IEEE 37th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS).

[29]  Honggang Zhang,et al.  Incentive mechanism for proximity-based Mobile Crowd Service systems , 2016, IEEE INFOCOM 2016 - The 35th Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications.

[30]  Cyrus Shahabi,et al.  GeoCrowd: enabling query answering with spatial crowdsourcing , 2012, SIGSPATIAL/GIS.

[31]  Ming Li,et al.  Sybil-Proof Online Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsensing , 2018, IEEE INFOCOM 2018 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications.

[32]  Pin Lv,et al.  Towards Profit Optimization During Online Participant Selection in Compressive Mobile Crowdsensing , 2019, ACM Trans. Sens. Networks.

[33]  Dejun Yang,et al.  Group Buying Spectrum Auctions in Cognitive Radio Networks , 2017, IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology.

[34]  Tao Li,et al.  Online Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsourcing Based on Two-Tiered Social Crowdsourcing Architecture , 2018, 2018 15th Annual IEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication, and Networking (SECON).

[35]  Avrim Blum,et al.  Online algorithms for market clearing , 2002, SODA '02.

[36]  Yunhao Liu,et al.  Toward Efficient Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsensing , 2017, IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology.

[37]  Fan Ye,et al.  Mobile crowdsensing: current state and future challenges , 2011, IEEE Communications Magazine.

[38]  Zhetao Li,et al.  Towards Privacy-preserving Incentive for Mobile Crowdsensing Under An Untrusted Platform , 2019, IEEE INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications.

[39]  Yanmin Zhu,et al.  Group Buying Based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing , 2016, 2016 13th Annual IEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication, and Networking (SECON).

[40]  He Huang,et al.  TCAM: A truthful combinatorial auction mechanism for crowdsourcing systems , 2018, 2018 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC).

[41]  Qian Zhang,et al.  Truthful online double auctions for dynamic mobile crowdsourcing , 2015, 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM).