The Basic Approval Voting Game

There is a vast literature which conceives Approval Voting as a mechanism where the approval of voters is a mere strategic action with no intrinsic meaning. As usual, a group of voters who have preferences over a set candidates is considered. Every voter announces the list of candidates which he approves of and the winners are the candidates which receive the highest number of approvals. Assuming that voters take simultaneous and strategic actions, we are confronted to a normal form game whose analysis dates back to Brams and Fishburn (1983). This chapter surveys the main results of this literature.

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