A Discriminatory Rewarding Mechanism for Sybil Detection with Applications to Tor

This paper presents an economic game for sybil detection in a distributed computing environment. Cost parameters reflecting impacts of different sybil attacks are introduced in the sybil detection game. The optimal strategies for this game in which both sybil and non-sybil identities are expected to participate are devised. A cost sharing economic mechanism called Discriminatory Rewarding Mechanism for Sybil Detection is proposed based on this game. A detective accepts a security deposit from each active agent, negotiates with the agents and offers rewards to the sybils if the latter disclose their identity. The basic objective of the detective is to determine the optimum reward amount for each sybil which will encourage the maximum possible number of sybils to reveal themselves. Maintaining privacy is an important issue for the mechanism since the participants involved in the negotiation are generally reluctant to share their private information. The mechanism has been applied to Tor by introducing a reputation scoring function. Keywords—Game theory, Incentive mechanism, Reputation,

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