论文信息 - How to cheat against a simple mixed strategy ESS

How to cheat against a simple mixed strategy ESS

A randomly determined mixed strategy can always be invaded by “cheaters” in a symmetric two-strategy game in a finite population and thus is never an ESS. After proving the above statement, I discuss situations under which non-randomly determined mixed strategies may be evolutionarily stable.

William L. Vickery | W. Vickery

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