Should regulators reveal information about banks

Regulators collect and produce information about banks. This information helps regulators monitor the safety and soundness of the banking system, and it also helps policymakers preserve financial stability. A key issue is whether this information should be made public and, if so, to what extent. In this article, we will explore some of the tradeoffs involved.

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