论文信息 - Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions

Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions

In Peleg's investigation of the representation of a simple game by a social choice function, it is shown that a special kind of proper symmetric simple game has its representation by employing the elimination procedure. In this paper, we consider a representation of a characteristic function game and explore general conditions under which the elimination procedure works effectively.

Kenjiro Nakamura | S. Ishikawa | K. Nakamura

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