Two Agent Allocation Problems and the First Best

We consider a general class of two agent allocation problems and identify the complete class of first best rules. By first best rules we mean allocation rules for which we can find efficient, strategyproof and budget balanced mechanisms. We show that the only first best rules are the fixed share allocation rules.

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