Hazard analysis for AADL model

Safety analysis is a significant aspect of safety critical embedded systems. In this paper, an architecture-based hazard analysis method is presented to support safety assessment for Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) model of embedded systems during early development phases. For further improving the hazard analytical ability of AADL, Hazard Model Annex is created. In order to improve the quality of system and the software development process, a safety model can be established by extending AADL model with error model and hazard model to specify fault behavior and hazard behavior of system. Hazard factor can be identified in safety model through hazard analysis. Additionally, conversion rules and formal methods are formulated to transform safety model into Deterministic Stochastic Petri Net (DSPN) for quantitative analysis using an existing tool. Finally, a safety analysis table is generated for overall evaluation of hazards, including hazard risk acceptance level, to help engineers to eliminate or control component hazards in an acceptance level. A small case study, based on fire alarm system, is utilized to demonstrate the feasibility of hazard analysis method for AADL model.

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