An Integrated Physical Dispersion and Behavioral Response Model for Risk Assessment of Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) Events

A radiological dispersion device (RDD) or "dirty" bomb is a conventional explosive wrapped in radiological material. Terrorists may use an RDD to disperse radioactive material across a populated area, causing casualties and/or economic damage. Nearly all risk assessment models for RDDs make unrealistic assumptions about public behavior in their health assessments, including assumptions that the public would stand outside in a single location indefinitely. In this article, we describe an approach for assessing the risks of RDD events incorporating both physical dispersion and behavioral response variables. The general approach is tested using the City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as a case study. Atmospheric models simulate an RDD attack and its likely fallout, while radiation exposure models assess fatal cancer risk. We model different geographical distributions of the population based on time of day. We evaluate aggregate health impacts for different public responses (i.e., sheltering-in-place, evacuating). We find that current RDD models in use can be improved with the integration of behavioral components. Using the results from the model, we show how risk varies across several behavioral and physical variables. We show that the best policy to recommend to the public depends on many different variables, such as the amount of trauma at ground zero, the capability of emergency responders to get trauma victims to local hospitals quickly and efficiently, how quickly evacuations can take place in the city, and the amount of shielding available for shelterers. Using a parametric analysis, we develop behaviorally realistic risk assessments, we identify variables that can affect an optimal risk reduction policy, and we find that decision making can be improved by evaluating the tradeoff between trauma and cancer fatalities for various RDD scenarios before they occur.