Charging for public services: the case of utilities in Norwegian local governments

Abstract This paper empirically analyzes the determinants of utility charges using a panel data set for a sample of Norwegian local governments. There is strong evidence of revenue substitution in the sense that local governments increase their utility charges when other sources of revenue (lump-sum grants and regulated tax revenue) become more restricted. Moreover, local political institutions are shown to be important: a high share of socialist representatives in the local council leads to high utility charges, whereas a strong political leadership is able to keep utility charges low.

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