Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia

Abstract The paper examines a large population analog of fictitious play in which players learn from personal experience, focusing on what happens when a single rational player is added to the population. Because the learning process naturally generates contagion dynamics, the rational player at times has an incentive to act nonmyopically. In 2 × 2 games the dynamics are asymmetric and favor risk dominant equilibria. A variety of other examples are presented. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C7.

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