Early Hybrid Safety and Security Risk Assessment Based on Interdisciplinary Dependency Models

Safety and security of complex critical infrastructures are very important for economic, environmental and social reasons. The complexity of these systems introduces difficulties in the identification of safety and security risks that emerge from interdisciplinary interactions and dependencies. The discovery of safety and security design weaknesses late in the design process and during system operation can lead to increased costs, additional system complexity, delays and possibly undesirable compromises to address safety and security weaknesses.

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