The Price of Anarchy in Auctions
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Éva Tardos,et al. No-Regret Learning in Repeated Bayesian Games , 2015, ArXiv.
[2] Uriel Feige,et al. The Submodular Welfare Problem with Demand Queries , 2010, Theory Comput..
[3] Alkmini Sgouritsa,et al. On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources , 2016, Theory of Computing Systems.
[4] Vahab S. Mirrokni,et al. Robust Price of Anarchy Bounds via LP and Fenchel Duality , 2015, SODA.
[5] S. Boicheva. Mechanism Design without Money , 2012 .
[6] Evdokia Nikolova,et al. Asymptotically Tight Bounds for Inefficiency in Risk-Averse Selfish Routing , 2015, IJCAI.
[7] Paul Dütting,et al. Algorithms against Anarchy: Understanding Non-Truthful Mechanisms , 2015, EC.
[8] E. Maskin. Asymmetric Auctions , 2007 .
[9] Paul Dütting,et al. Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions , 2013, WINE.
[10] Shuchi Chawla,et al. Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing , 2010, BQGT.
[11] Haim Kaplan,et al. Non-price equilibria in markets of discrete goods , 2011, EC '11.
[12] Manfred K. Warmuth,et al. The Weighted Majority Algorithm , 1994, Inf. Comput..
[13] Paul Dütting,et al. Algorithms as mechanisms: the price of anarchy of relax-and-round , 2015, SECO.
[14] J. Robinson. AN ITERATIVE METHOD OF SOLVING A GAME , 1951, Classics in Game Theory.
[15] A. Razborov. Communication Complexity , 2011 .
[16] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding , 2011, SODA '11.
[17] Shahar Dobzinski,et al. Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations , 2013, SODA.
[18] Moshe Tennenholtz,et al. Approximate mechanism design without money , 2009, EC '09.
[19] Do Externalities Degrade GSP ’ s Efficiency ? , 2012 .
[20] Alkmini Sgouritsa,et al. On the Efficiency of All-Pay Mechanisms , 2015, Algorithmica.
[21] Vasilis Syrgkanis,et al. Greedy Algorithms Make Efficient Mechanisms , 2015, EC.
[22] Renato Paes Leme,et al. Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets , 2013, ICALP.
[23] Roger B. Myerson,et al. Optimal Auction Design , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..
[24] Michael R. Baye,et al. The all-pay auction with complete information , 1990 .
[25] Michal Feldman,et al. Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements , 2016, EC.
[26] Renato Paes Leme,et al. Price competition in online combinatorial markets , 2014, WWW.
[27] D. Gale,et al. Multi-Item Auctions , 1986, Journal of Political Economy.
[28] M. R. Rao,et al. Combinatorial Optimization , 1992, NATO ASI Series.
[29] D. Fudenberg,et al. The Theory of Learning in Games , 1998 .
[30] Annamária Kovács,et al. Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions , 2008, ICALP.
[31] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Combinatorial auctions with restricted complements , 2012, EC '12.
[32] Jason D. Hartline,et al. Auctions with unique equilibria , 2013, EC '13.
[33] Ioannis Caragiannis,et al. Welfare Guarantees for Proportional Allocations , 2014, SAGT.
[34] Stephen Morris,et al. Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information March 31 , 2013 , 2013 .
[35] Annamária Kovács,et al. Tight Bounds for the Price of Anarchy of Simultaneous First-Price Auctions , 2013, TEAC.
[36] James Hannan,et al. 4. APPROXIMATION TO RAYES RISK IN REPEATED PLAY , 1958 .
[37] Renato Paes Leme,et al. On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions , 2011, EC '11.
[38] Jason D. Hartline,et al. Price of anarchy for auction revenue , 2014, EC.
[39] Michal Feldman,et al. Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient , 2012, STOC '13.
[40] L. Shapley,et al. The assignment game I: The core , 1971 .
[41] Paul Milgrom,et al. Putting Auction Theory to Work , 2004 .
[42] Jeroen M. Swinkels. Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions , 2001 .
[43] R. Vohra,et al. Algorithmic Game Theory: Mechanism Design without Money , 2007 .
[44] Nicole Immorlica,et al. A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes , 2014, AAAI.
[45] William Vickrey,et al. Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .
[46] Evangelos Markakis,et al. Uniform Price Auctions: Equilibria and Efficiency , 2014, Theory of Computing Systems.
[47] Gábor Lugosi,et al. Prediction, learning, and games , 2006 .
[48] Renato Paes Leme,et al. Sequential auctions and externalities , 2011, SODA.
[49] Y. Freund,et al. Adaptive game playing using multiplicative weights , 1999 .
[50] Nima Haghpanah,et al. Multi-dimensional Virtual Values and Second-degree Price Discrimination , 2014 .
[51] Shahar Dobzinski,et al. On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions , 2014, SODA.
[52] Éva Tardos,et al. Composable and efficient mechanisms , 2012, STOC '13.
[53] Hu Fu,et al. Prior-independent auctions for risk-averse agents , 2013, EC '13.
[54] M. Satterthwaite,et al. Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading , 1983 .
[55] Tim Roughgarden,et al. The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information , 2012, SECO.
[56] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory , 2016, Bull. EATCS.
[57] Renato Paes Leme,et al. Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction , 2010, 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
[58] Wolfgang Leininger,et al. Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case , 1996 .
[59] Renato Paes Leme,et al. On the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism , 2013, EC.
[60] Balasubramanian Sivan,et al. Optimal Crowdsourcing Contests , 2011, Encyclopedia of Algorithms.
[61] S. Bikhchandani. Auctions of Heterogeneous Objects , 1999 .
[62] Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi,et al. Gambling in a rigged casino: The adversarial multi-armed bandit problem , 1995, Proceedings of IEEE 36th Annual Foundations of Computer Science.
[63] Renato Paes Leme,et al. GSP auctions with correlated types , 2011, EC '11.
[64] Noam Nisan,et al. Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders , 2005, STOC '05.
[65] Shmuel Zamir,et al. Asymmetric First-Price Auctions With Uniform Distributions: Analytic Solutions to the General Case , 2007 .
[66] D. Bergemann,et al. Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information , 2011 .
[67] Constantinos Daskalakis,et al. Learning in Auctions: Regret is Hard, Envy is Easy , 2015, 2016 IEEE 57th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS).
[68] Yang Cai,et al. On the Economic Efficiency of the Combinatorial Clock Auction , 2015, SODA.
[69] Ulrich Berger,et al. Fictitious play in 2×n games , 2005, J. Econ. Theory.
[70] Paul R. Milgrom,et al. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding II , 2000 .
[71] E. Maskin,et al. Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers , 1984 .
[72] Nikhil R. Devanur,et al. Simple Auctions with Simple Strategies , 2015, EC.
[73] Ron Siegel,et al. Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations , 2014, J. Econ. Theory.
[74] Steven R. Williams,et al. The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism , 2002 .
[75] Daniel Lehmann,et al. Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities , 2001, EC '01.
[76] Allan Borodin,et al. Price of anarchy for greedy auctions , 2009, SODA '10.
[77] Rann Smorodinsky,et al. All-Pay Auctions - An Experimental Study , 2006 .
[78] Tim Roughgarden,et al. The price of anarchy in large games , 2015, STOC.
[79] S. Matthew Weinberg,et al. Interpolating Between Truthful and non-Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions , 2015, SODA.
[80] René Kirkegaard,et al. Ranking asymmetric auctions: Filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch , 2014, Games Econ. Behav..
[81] L. Shapley,et al. Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests , 1996 .
[82] John N. Tsitsiklis,et al. Efficiency loss in a network resource allocation game: the case of elastic supply , 2004, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
[83] Milan Vojnovic,et al. Crowdsourcing and all-pay auctions , 2009, EC '09.
[84] Paul Dütting,et al. Best-Response Dynamics in Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding , 2016, SODA.
[85] Vasilis Syrgkanis,et al. Bayesian Games and the Smoothness Framework , 2012, ArXiv.
[86] Lawrence M. Ausubel,et al. The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design , 2004 .
[87] Vasileios Syrgkanis,et al. Efficiency of Mechanisms in Complex Markets , 2014 .
[88] Éva Tardos,et al. Bayesian sequential auctions , 2012, EC '12.
[89] Steven R. Williams,et al. Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information , 1994 .
[90] Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al. Worst-case equilibria , 1999 .
[91] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Communication Complexity (for Algorithm Designers) , 2015, Found. Trends Theor. Comput. Sci..
[92] Éva Tardos,et al. Smooth Online Mechanisms: A Game-Theoretic Problem in Renewable Energy Markets , 2015, EC.
[93] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Barriers to Near-Optimal Equilibria , 2014, 2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
[94] Yang Cai,et al. A duality-based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design , 2016, SECO.
[95] Éva Tardos,et al. No-Regret Learning in Bayesian Games , 2015, NIPS.
[96] Robert J. Weber,et al. An Example of a Multi-Object Auction Game , 1979 .
[97] Paul R. Milgrom,et al. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding , 1982 .
[98] Jeroen M. Swinkels,et al. EFFICIENCY OF LARGE DOUBLE AUCTIONS , 2003 .
[99] Yang Cai,et al. Simultaneous bayesian auctions and computational complexity , 2014, EC.
[100] S. Hart,et al. A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium , 2000 .
[101] E. Maasland,et al. Auction Theory , 2021, Springer Texts in Business and Economics.
[102] Éva Tardos,et al. Learning and Efficiency in Games with Dynamic Population , 2015, SODA.
[103] O. H. Brownlee,et al. ACTIVITY ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTION AND ALLOCATION , 1952 .
[104] D. Bergemann,et al. Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information , 2011 .