Towards Optimal Patrol Strategies for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems
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Milind Tambe | Kevin Leyton-Brown | Tuomas Sandholm | Christopher Kiekintveld | Albert Xin Jiang | Matthew P. Johnson | Zhengyu Yin | Kevin Leyton-Brown | Milind Tambe | T. Sandholm | Christopher Kiekintveld | A. Jiang | Zhengyu Yin | Matthew P. Johnson
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