Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study
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Miguel A. Costa-Gomes | Vincent P. Crawford | Bruno Broseta | Miguel A. Costa-Gomes | V. Crawford | Bruno Broseta | Vincent P Crawford
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