Constructing Speculative Demand Functions in Equilibrium Markets

In computational markets utilizing algorithms that establish a general equilibrium, competitive behavior is usually assumed: each agent makes its demand (supply) decisions so as to maximize its utility (profit) assuming that it has no impact on market prices. However, there is a potential gain from strategic behavior via speculating about others because an agent does affect the market prices, which affect the supply/demand decisions of others, which again affect the market prices that the agent faces. Determining the optimal strategy when the speculator has perfect knowledge about the other agents is a well known problem which has been studied... Read complete abstract on page 2.

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