Towards provable security for ad hoc routing protocols

We propose a formal framework for the security analysis of on-demand source routing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks. Our approach is based on the well-known simulation paradigm that has been proposed to prove the security of cryptographic protocols. Our main contribution is the application of the simulation-based approach in the context of ad hoc routing. This involves a precise definition of a real-world model, which describes the real operation of the protocol, and an ideal-world model, which captures what the protocol wants to achieve in terms of security. Both models take into account the peculiarities of wireless communications and ad hoc routing. Then, we give a formal definition of routing security in terms of indistinguishability of the two models from the point of view of honest parties. We demonstrate the usefulness of our approach by analyzing two "secure" ad hoc routing protocols, SRP and Ariadne. This analysis leads to the discovery of as yet unknown attacks against both protocols. Finally, we propose a new ad hoc routing protocol and prove it to be secure in our model.