论文信息 - The kernel for reasonable outcomes in a cooperative game - 字舞流文

The kernel for reasonable outcomes in a cooperative game

It is shown that the prekernel and the pre-nucleolus of a cooperative game coincide with the kernel and the nucleolus for the reasonable set of the game respectively.

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