The role of BWR secondary containments in severe accident mitigation: Issues and insights from recent analyses

Abstract All commercial boiling water reactor (BWR) plants in the US employ primary containments of the pressure suppression design. These primary containments are surrounded and enclosed by secondary containments. While not designed for severe accident mitigation, these secondary containments might also reduce the radiological consequences of severe accidents. This issue is receiving increasing attention due to concerns that BWR MK I primary containment integrity would be lost should a significant mass of molten debris escape the reactor vessel during a severe accident. The fission product retention capability of an intact secondary containment will depend on several factors. Recent analyses indicate that the major factors influencing secondary containment effectiveness include: the mode and location of the primary containment failure, the internal architectural design of the secondary containment, the design of the standby gas treatment system, and the ability of fire protection system sprays to remove suspended aerosols from the the secondary containment atmosphere. Each of these factors interact in a very complex manner to determine secondary containment severe accident mitigation performance. This paper presents a brief overview of US BWR secondary containment designs and highlights plant-specific features that could influence secondary containment severe accident survivability and accident mitigation effectiveness. Current issues surrounding secondary containment performance are discussed, and insights gained from recent secondary containment studies of Browns Ferry, Peach Bottom, and Shoreham are presented. Areas of significant uncertainty are identified and recommendations for future research are presented.

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