Frequency formats, probability formats, or problem structure? A test of the nested-sets hypothesis in an extensional reasoning task

Five experiments addressed a controversy in the probability judgment literature that centers on the efficacy of framing probabilities as frequencies. The natural frequency view predicts that frequency formats attenuate errors, while the nested-sets view predicts that highlighting the set-subset structure of the problem reduces error, regardless of problem format. This study tested these predictions using a conjunction task. Previous studies reporting that frequency formats reduced conjunction errors confounded reference class with problem format. After controlling this confound, the present study's findings show that conjunction errors can be reduced using either a probability or a frequency format, that frequency effects depend upon the presence of a reference class, and that frequency formats do not promote better statistical reasoning than probability formats.

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