Understanding Metaphors: The Paradox of Unlike Things Compared

Since Aristotle, many writers have treated metaphors and similes as equals: any metaphor can be paraphrased as a simile, and vice-versa. This property of metaphors is the foundation of standard comparison theories of metaphor comprehension. On this view, metaphors such as “my job is a jail” are literally false, and so cannot be directly interpreted. Instead, such “irrational” assertions are converted to similes (i.e., my job is like a jail) and understood as any literal comparison would be. Comparison theories rely on three assumptions: (1). Literal interpretations have unconditional priority; (2). Metaphor interpretation is optional, triggered whenever a literal interpretation fails to make sense in context; (3). Following assumptions (1) and (2), metaphor processing is not only more difficult than literal, but involves different processing mechanisms. I argue that none of the above assumptions hold. In addition, I show that metaphors cannot always be paraphrased as similes. The different forms of a metaphor – the comparison and categorical forms – have different referents. In comparison form, the metaphor vehicle refers to the literal concept, e.g., in my lawyer is like a shark, the term “shark” refers to the literal fish. In categorical form, my lawyer is a shark, “shark” refers to an abstract (metaphorical) category of predatory creatures. This difference in reference makes it possible for a metaphor and its corresponding simile to differ (a) in interpretability and (b) in meaning. Because a metaphor cannot always be understood in terms of its corresponding simile, I conclude that comparison theories of metaphor are fundamentally flawed. Metaphors can be processed directly as categorization assertions. Furthermore, when such metaphors are novel, they create new categories that are available for public discourse.