论文信息 - A game-theoretic approach to network equilibrium

A game-theoretic approach to network equilibrium

A noncooperative game is formulated on a transportation network with congestion. The players are associated with origin-destination pairs; each player supplies from an origin a destination, where demand is variable. A Nash-Cournot equilibrium is defined and conditions for existence and uniqueness are provided. The asymptotic behaviour of the equilibrium is shown to yield a total flow vector corresponding to a competitive equilibrium.

P. Marcotte | A. Haurie

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