论文信息 - An Extended Reinforcement Algorithm for Estimation of Human Behaviour in Experimental Congestion Games

An Extended Reinforcement Algorithm for Estimation of Human Behaviour in Experimental Congestion Games

The paper reports simulations applied on two similar congestion games: the first is the classical minority game. The second one is an asymmetric variation of the minority game with linear payoff functions. For each game, simulation results based on an extended reinforcement algorithm are compared with real experimental statistics. It is shown that the extension of the reinforcement model is essential for fitting the experimental data and estimating the player's behaviour.

Thomas Pitz | Thorsten Chmura | T. Chmura | Thomas Pitz

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