Microfoundations of the Rule of Law

Many social scientists rely on the rule of law in their accounts of political or economic development. Many, however, simply equate law with a stable government capable of enforcing the rules generated by a political authority. As two decades of largely failed efforts to build the rule of law in poor and transition countries and continuing struggles to build international legal order demonstrate, we still do not understand how legal order is produced, especially in places where it does not already exist. We here canvas literature in the social sciences to identify the themes and gaps in the existing accounts. We conclude that this literature has failed to produce a microfoundational account of the phenomenon of legal order. We then discuss our recent effort to develop the missing microfoundations of legal order to provide a better framework for future work on the rule of law.

[1]  Terence H. Qualter,et al.  Democracy and the Market , 1991 .

[2]  Mathew D. McCubbins,et al.  The Rule of Law Unplugged , 2009 .

[3]  R. Coase The Nature of the Firm , 1937 .

[4]  M. Finnemore,et al.  International Norm Dynamics and Political Change , 1998, International Organization.

[5]  R. Paternoster,et al.  Sanction threats and appeals to morality : Testing a rational choice model of corporate crime , 1996 .

[6]  Barry D. Friedman Taking Law Seriously , 2006, Perspectives on Politics.

[7]  Gillian K. Hadfield,et al.  What Is Law? A Coordination Model of the Characteristics of Legal Order , 2012 .

[8]  Jane E. Stromseth,et al.  Can Might Make Rights?: Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions , 2006 .

[9]  Jeffrey R. Lax The New Judicial Politics of Legal Doctrine , 2011 .

[10]  Barry R. Weingast The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development , 1995 .

[11]  Barry R. Weingast The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law , 1997, American Political Science Review.

[12]  U. Fischbacher,et al.  Social norms and human cooperation , 2004, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[13]  B. Tamanaha The Primacy of Society and the Failure of Law and Development , 2009 .

[14]  James A. Robinson,et al.  Why nations fail ? The origins of Power , Prosperity and Poverty , 2015 .

[15]  A. D'Amato Is International Law Really “Law”?⋆ , 2010 .

[16]  W. MacLeod,et al.  Implicit Contracts, Incentive Com-patibility, and Involuntary Unemployment , 1989 .

[17]  Jeffrey Katz Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance , 2006 .

[18]  Margaret Levi,et al.  Legitimating beliefs: Sources and indicators , 2009 .

[19]  J. Locke,et al.  The Second Treatise of Civil Government , 1986 .

[20]  C. Mills,et al.  The Theory of Social and Economic Organization , 1948 .

[21]  Ronald Smith,et al.  Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty , 2012 .

[22]  Tim P. Tryniecki The Limits of International Law , 2007 .

[23]  Douglass C. North,et al.  Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England , 1989, The Journal of Economic History.

[24]  P. Ordeshook Constitutional stability , 1992 .

[25]  Emerson H. Tiller,et al.  What is Legal Doctrine , 2005 .

[26]  B. Malinowski,et al.  Crime and Custom in Savage Society , 1927, Nature.

[27]  Scott J. Shapiro,et al.  Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law , 2011 .

[28]  Richard H. McAdams,et al.  A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law , 2000 .

[29]  E. Hoebel,et al.  The law of primitive man : a study in comparative legal dynamics , 1955 .

[30]  Emily Ryo Through the Back Door: Applying Theories of Legal Compliance to Illegal Immigration During the Chinese Exclusion Era , 2006, Law & Social Inquiry.

[31]  J. Waldron,et al.  The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure , 2010 .

[32]  Robert O. Keohane,et al.  Reciprocity in international relations , 1986, International Organization.

[33]  Ernst Fehr,et al.  Chapter 8 The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories , 2006 .

[34]  J. Locke,et al.  The second treatise of government , 1952 .

[35]  Florencio López‐de‐Silanes,et al.  Law and Finance , 1996, Journal of Political Economy.

[36]  Robert D. Cooter,et al.  Expressive Law And Economics , 1998, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[37]  P. Bohannan The Differing Realms of the Law , 2009 .

[38]  Emily Ryo,et al.  Deciding to Cross : Norms and Economics of Unauthorized Migration , 2013 .

[39]  Gillian K. Hadfield,et al.  Law without the State , 2013, Journal of Law and Courts.

[40]  I. Sened,et al.  Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Growth: The Legacy of Douglass North , 2014 .

[41]  D. D. Uyl : On Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations: A Philosophical Companion , 2005 .

[42]  W. Dugger The Economic Institutions of Capitalism , 1987 .

[43]  R. Boyd,et al.  The evolution of altruistic punishment , 2003, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[44]  A. Greif Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders , 1989, The Journal of Economic History.

[45]  J. Finnis Law as Co‐ordination , 1989 .

[46]  Gillian K. Hadfield,et al.  Constitutions as Coordinating Devices , 2013 .

[47]  Samuel Fleischacker Book Review: On Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations: A Philosophical Companion , 2006 .

[48]  Margaret Levi,et al.  Consent, dissent, and patriotism , 1997 .

[49]  Anne-Marie Slaughter,et al.  A New World Order , 2004 .

[50]  R. Hinde,et al.  Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Collective Action , 2010 .

[51]  Kevin J. Murphy,et al.  Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm , 1997 .

[52]  Stephen J. Toope,et al.  Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of Law and Politics , 2001, International Organization.

[53]  G. Stigler,et al.  Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers , 1974, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[54]  D. North Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance: Economic performance , 1990 .

[55]  A. Greif Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition , 1993 .

[56]  Thomas Carothers Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge , 2006 .

[57]  M. Trebilcock,et al.  Rule of Law Reform and Development: Charting the Fragile Path of Progress , 2008 .

[58]  James M. Malcomson,et al.  Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment , 1988, Journal of Political Economy.

[59]  J. Braithwaite,et al.  Global Business Regulation , 2001 .

[60]  Friedrich A. von Hayek,et al.  The Constitution of Liberty , 1961 .

[61]  R. Myerson Justice, Institutions, and Multiple Equilibria , 2004 .

[62]  Benjamin Klein,et al.  Why 'Hold-Ups' Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships , 1996 .

[63]  Klaus M. Schmidt,et al.  The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism--Experimental Evidence and New Theories. , 2005 .

[64]  Robert C. Ellickson Order without law : how neighbors settle disputes , 2009 .

[65]  J. Botero,et al.  Measuring the Rule of Law , 2011 .

[66]  Andrew T. Guzman How International Law Works , 2008 .

[67]  Hans Kelsen,et al.  The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence , 1941 .

[68]  L. Epstein,et al.  The choices justices make , 1997 .

[69]  Barry R. Weingast,et al.  Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild , 1994, Journal of Political Economy.

[70]  M. Whinston,et al.  Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity , 1998 .

[71]  Paolo Leon The Economic Institutions of Capitalism , 1986, The Antitrust Bulletin.

[72]  P. Haas Do regimes matter? Epistemic communities and Mediterranean pollution control , 1989, International Organization.

[73]  A. Chayes,et al.  The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements , 1995 .

[74]  Ronald Dworkin,et al.  Taking Rights Seriously , 1977 .

[75]  David M. Kreps,et al.  Relational Incentive Contracts , 2003 .

[76]  E. Fehr,et al.  Altruistic punishment in humans , 2002, Nature.

[77]  D. Rodrik One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth , 2007 .

[78]  Ronald Dworkin,et al.  Taking Rights Seriously. , 1978 .

[79]  Sally Falk Moore Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach , 1978 .

[80]  S. Gezelius Do Norms Count? State Regulation and Compliance in a Norwegian Fishing Community , 2002 .

[81]  A. Heifetz Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge. , 2004 .

[82]  Andrew J. Macintyre,et al.  The Rule of Law and Economic Development , 2008 .

[83]  R. Morgan Neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary debate , 1994 .

[84]  Steven Shavell,et al.  Handbook of Law and Economics , 2007 .

[85]  A. Greif,et al.  On the Political Foundations of the Late Medieval Commercial Revolution: Genoa During the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries , 1994, The Journal of Economic History.

[86]  A. Shleifer,et al.  Legal Determinants of External Finance , 1997 .

[87]  Andrew T. Guzman How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory , 2008 .

[88]  R. Brooks The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms and the Rule of Law , 2003 .

[89]  K. Basu Prelude to Political Economy: A Study of the Social and Political Foundations of Economics , 2000 .

[90]  Anne-Marie Slaughter,et al.  International Law, International Relations and Compliance , 2002 .

[91]  M. Trebilcock,et al.  Rule of Law Reform and Development , 2008 .

[92]  H. Gintis,et al.  The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity: Cooperation in Heterogeneous Populations , 2004 .

[93]  L. Telser A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements , 1980 .

[94]  Nicola Gennaioli,et al.  The Evolution of Common Law , 2007, Journal of Political Economy.

[95]  Gerald J. Postema,et al.  Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law , 1982, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[96]  Colin Camerer Behavioral Game Theory , 1990 .

[97]  Rachel Kleinfeld,et al.  Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: Implications for Practitioners , 2005 .

[98]  S. Schneebaum The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements , 1995 .

[99]  F. Fukuyama Democracy's Past and Future: Transitions to the Rule of Law , 2010 .

[100]  Colin Camerer,et al.  Foundations of Human Sociality - Economic Experiments and Ethnographic: Evidence From Fifteen Small-Scale Societies , 2004 .

[101]  Gillian K. Hadfield The Levers of Legal Design: Institutional Determinants of the Quality of Law , 2007 .

[102]  J. Henrich,et al.  Costly Punishment Across Human Societies , 2006, Science.

[103]  Joan V. Robinson,et al.  The Nature of the Firm , 2004 .

[104]  R. Boyd,et al.  Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare , 2010, Science.

[105]  Lon L. Fuller,et al.  The Morality of Law. , 1965 .

[106]  H. Koh Why Do Nations Obey International Law , 1997 .

[107]  Kenneth W. Abbott,et al.  Hard and Soft Law in International Governance , 2000, International Organization.

[108]  J. Richard,et al.  The Transplant Effect , 2003 .

[109]  McNollgast The Political Economy of Law , 2007 .

[110]  Thomas M. Franck,et al.  Fairness in International Law and Institutions , 1996 .

[111]  R. Dworkin Law's Empire , 1987 .

[112]  J. Raz,et al.  The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality , 1979 .

[113]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  The role of institutions in the revival of trade: the law merchant , 1990 .

[114]  Guangdong Xu The Role of Law in Economic Growth: A Literature Review , 2011 .

[115]  Mark S. Granovetter Economic Institutions as Social Constructions: A Framework for Analysis , 1992 .

[116]  Marijana Bađun,et al.  Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade / Avner Greif. , 2009 .