Flexible Estimation of Policy Preferences for Witnesses in Committee Hearings

Theoretical expectations regarding communication patterns between legislators and outside agents, such as lobbyists, agency officials, or policy experts, often depend on the relationship between legislators’ and agents’ preferences. However, legislators and nonelected outside agents evaluate the merits of policies using distinct criteria and considerations. We develop a measurement method that flexibly estimates the policy preferences for a class of outside agents—witnesses in committee hearings—separate from that of legislators’ and compute their preference distance across the two dimensions. In our application to Medicare hearings, we find that legislators in the U.S. Congress heavily condition their questioning of witnesses on preference distance, showing that legislators tend to seek policy information from like-minded experts in committee hearings. We do not find this result using a conventional measurement placing both actors on one dimension. The contrast in results lends support for the construct validity of our proposed preference measures.

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