论文信息 - The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model - 字舞流文

The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model

Abstract In the following paper, we treat, in a general setting, the problem of existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model, and we give several examples of contract sets containing optimal contracts.

[1] Preservation of Weak Convergence Under Mapping , 1967 .

[2] Sanford J. Grossman,et al. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM , 1983 .

[3] S. M. Robinson,et al. A sufficient condition for continuity of optimal sets in mathematical programming , 1974 .

[4] Philip A. Neher,et al. Peasants, Procreation, and Pensions , 1971 .

[5] J. Mirrlees. The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization , 1976 .

[6] S. Ross. The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem , 1973 .

[7] Bengt Holmstrom,et al. Moral Hazard and Observability , 1979 .

[8] William P. Rogerson,et al. THE FIRST-ORDER APPROACH TO PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS , 1985 .

[9] R. Zeckhauser,et al. Insurance, Information, and Individual Action , 1971 .

[10] S. Shavell. Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship , 1979 .

[11] M. Harris,et al. Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information , 1979 .

[12] R. Myerson. Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems , 1982 .