论文信息 - Intercorporate shareholdings and corporate control in the Japanese firm

Intercorporate shareholdings and corporate control in the Japanese firm

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to specify a formal model that rationalizes the intercorporate shareholdings observed in the Japanese equity market as a mechanism for mutual commitment and risk sharing that creates greater possibilities to resolve managerial myopic problems caused by the threat of external takeovers. We show that, under certain conditions, all agents including the existing shareholders of the firm are strictly better off when participating in an implicit contract associated with intercorporate shareholdings. The results also suggest that intercorporate ownership raises the stock prices of the member firms.

Hiroshi Osano | Hiroshi Osano

[1] David Flath,et al. The Keiretsu Puzzle , 1996 .

[2] Takao Kato,et al. Experiences, credentials, and compensation in the Japanese and U.S. managerial labor markets: Evidence from new micro data , 1992 .

[3] Ronald Dore,et al. The Japanese firm : the sources of competitive strength , 1997 .

[4] E. Perotti,et al. The governance structure of the Japanese financial keiretsu , 1994 .

[5] P. Sheard. The main bank system and corporate monitoring and control in Japan , 1989 .

[6] Albert S. Kyle,et al. Noise Trading and Takeovers , 1991 .

[7] S. Prowse,et al. Institutional investment patterns and corporate financial behavior in the United States and Japan , 1990 .

[8] A. Shleifer,et al. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control , 1986, Journal of Political Economy.

[9] Masahiko Aoki,et al. The Economic analysis of the Japanese firm , 1984 .

[10] K. French,et al. Were Japanese Stock Prices Too High? , 1990 .

[11] Sanford J. Grossman,et al. The free-rider problem and the theory of the corporation , 1980 .

[12] Bernadette A. Minton,et al. Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards: Determinants and Implications for Managers , 1994 .

[13] M. Aoki. The nature of the Japanese firm as a nexus of employment and financial contracts: An overview , 1989 .

[14] M. Aoki. Information, Incentives and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy: A Microtheory of the Japanese Economy , 1988 .