Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates

Summary. A no-show paradox occurs each time a single voter or a group of voters can manipulate the outcome by not participating to the election process. Among other voting procedures, the scoring run-off methods, which eliminate progressively the alternatives on the basis of scoring rules, suffer from this flaw. We here estimate how frequent this paradox is for three candidate elections under the classical Impartial Culture and Impartial Anonymous Culture assumptions, for different population sizes. The conditions under which this paradox occurs are also described, as well as the relationships with manipulations for a fixed number of voters.

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